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of-use#LAAJUSTICE BRENNAN,  EQUALITY,  AND MAJORITY RULE
MARK  TUSHNETI
From the beginning of his service on the Supreme Court to the
end, Justice  Brennan  dealt  with  the  issues  of  equality  that  have
pervaded the development of the social order in the United States
and that have therefore pervaded constitutional  law.  His opinions
on these issues covered a wide range and contained  many themes.
Here I want to extract a single theme from the complex jurispru-
dence  of equality  that Justice  Brennan  articulated-the  theme  of
"majoritarian egalitarianism,"  to give it a label thatJustice Brennan
would never use.  After describing the way in which some of  Justice
Brennan's opinions reflected majoritarian egalitarianism,  I suggest
that the theme reflects a deeply attractive optimism about the state
of our society, an  optimism entirely  compatible with the Justice's
character.
1
Today, so  soon after Justice Brennan's resignation, it is almost
conventional  to note that his last opinion for the Court upheld an
affirmative  action  program.2  Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.  Federal
Communications  Commission3  involved  two  "minority  preference
policies" adopted by the Commission. Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court dealt with many topics:  It adopted a standard of review
for certain affirmative action programs, it endorsed "diversity" as a
permissible goal of federal action, and it rejected the argument that
stereotypes  alone  explained  why  the  Commission  believed  that
minority preference policies would promote  diversity.4
t  Professor of Law,  Georgetown University Law Center.
1 1 must note that I do not suggest that this single theme reconciles all of'Justice
Brennan's opinions dealingwith equality, or even that all of them express this theme,
or are at least consistent with it. I suspect that anyone's work over a period of over
thirty years would contain inconsistencies, and I have not canvassedJustice Brennan's
entire corpus to see if majoritarian egalitarianism  is even a dominant theme in his
opinions.  My claim is only that this theme can be found in a number of important
cases and that its presence sheds light on Justice Brennan's work and character.
2 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S.  Ct. 2997 (1990).  I suspect that, as
the events recede, the convention will change and another Brennan opinion about
equality will come to open commentators' and historians' discussions.  At this point,
though, there is no telling which opinion that would be.
3 id.
4 For a discussion of these and other aspects of the opinion, see Williams, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:  Regrouping in Singular Times,  104  HARv.  L. REv.  525
(1990).
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Here  I want  to focus  on only one facet of the case.  Although
the  Commission  initially  had  adopted  the  minority  preference
policies,  the  Court  analyzed  them  as  if  they  were  embodied  in
statutes  adopted  by  Congress.  For  the  Court,  the  fact  that  the
policies  were  "specifically  approved-indeed,  mandated-by  Con-
gress" was a fact of "overriding significance."
5
Congressional approval was important for several reasons.  First,
on the level of "court watching," many observers counted heads and
putJustice White in the camp of opponents of affirmative action, on
the basis of his opinion for the Court in Wards Cove Packing  Co. v.
Atonio6 and his vote against Richmond's affirmative action program
in  City of Richmond v. J.A.  Croson Co. 7  These observers  overlooked
Justice White's  even deeper  commitment to the affirmative use of
national  power in the service  of goals  of racial equality,  as  deter-
mined by Congress  itself.  For Justice White  to join the majority,
then, it was important to stress that Congress, not the Commission,
adopted the minority preferences.
It is too easy, and almost too cheap, to attribute Metro Broadcast-
ing's emphasis  on Congress  to Justice  Brennan's  ability to  build
coalitions.  After all, there was a good reason grounded in existing
doctrine  for  making  congressional  approval  crucial.8  The  Rich-
mond  affirmative  action  case  held  unconstitutional  a  "set aside"
program that reserved  a portion of the  city's construction budget
for  minority  contractors.9  The  Supreme  Court  had  upheld  a
federal  set  aside  program,  on  which  the  Richmond  one  was
modelled,  in Fullilove v. Klutznick.10  In rejecting  the  city's  effort
to rely on Fullilove, the Court in the Richmond  case distinguished
5 110 S.  Ct. at 3008.  The Commission adopted the policies in 1978.  Id. at 3004.
After the Commission's membership changed as a result of the election of Ronald
Reagan, it began an inquiry into whether the policy should be maintained.  In 1988,
Congress  responded  by barring  the  Commission  from  spending  any  money  to
examine or change the policies.  See id. at 3006.
6 109 S.  Ct. 2115  (1989).
7 488 U.S.  469 (1989).
8 I have discussedJustice Brennan's ability to build a coalition to support a result
surprising to outsiders in Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale (Book Review),  132 U. PA.  L.
REV.  1257,  1263-65  (1984).  In my defense,  my primary  evidence there  involved
Justice Brennan's invocation of  an idiosyncratic theory, adhered to almost exclusively
by Justice  Stevens, about  the  relative roles  of state  and national governments  in
regulating incidents of the status of aliens.  In Metro Broadcasting,  in contrast, the
doctrine on whichJustice Brennan relied recently had been adopted by a majority of
the Court.
9 488 U.S. at 511.
10 448 U.S.  448 (1980).BRENNAN,  EQUALITY, AND MAJORITY RULE
between the power of the national government to adopt affirmative
action programs and the power of state and local governments to do
so.  The difference, according to the Court, was that section five of
the  fourteenth  amendment  specifically  gave  Congress  power  to
enforce the guarantees of equal treatment embodied in section one
of that amendment, whereas section one itself limited the power of
states to deal with issues of race.11
Considered in light of general assumptions  about state govern-
ments,  the J.A.  Croson Court's  distinction  is  quite  remarkable.
Though  rooted  in  Katzenbach  v.  Morgan,12  the  distinction  is
difficult to sustain  as a textual  matter.  According to the Court in
J.A.  Croson,  the  city's  affirmative  action  program  violated  the
guarantee  in section  one of the  fourteenth  amendment  of equal
protection of the laws."  Consider an identical  affirmative  action
program  adopted  by  Congress.  Section  five  gives  Congress  the
power  to "enforce  . . . the provisions"  of section  one.14  But,  if
the  affirmative  action program in substance  violated  section  one,
the sense in which an identical federal program "enforces"  section
one is, to say the least, quite peculiar.
Even  more  remarkable,  the  Court's  distinction  in J.A.  Croson
contradicts  basic  assumptions  about  the structure  of the  govern-
ment.  The standard view divides  the constitutional order into two
parts:  powers and restrictions.  State governments,  it is ordinarily
held, have general legislative authority, subject solely to restrictions
placed on them by the Constitution, whereas  the  national govern-
ment is a government of enumerated powers.  As a government of
enumerated  powers,  the  national  government  cannot  have  more
power than state governments, though the states might be restricted
in ways  that the national government is not.  Yet, according toJ.A.
Croson, section  five is a sort of "super"-power, giving the national
government the power to do things that state governments cannot.1 5
1  488 U.S. at 490-91.
12 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966) ("Correctly viewed, §  5 is a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress  to exercise its discretion in determining whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
13  488 U.S. at 511.
14 U.S.  CONST. amend. XIV,  § 5.
15 One might try to rescuej.A. Croson along the following lines, not developed by
the Court.  Section one is a restriction  on the power of state governments.  The
national government is not subject to a similar restriction.  It may therefore exercise
any of  its enumerated powers to adopt programs that states are barred from adopting
by section one. Two difficulties with this reconstruction are apparent.  First and less
important, although section five played a seemingly important part in  the Court's
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Metro Broadcasting  simply took the distinction seriously.  Justice
Brennan  might  have  been  tweaking  the  conservatives  for  having
attempted disingenuously to preserve Fullilove while actually gutting
its rationale.  There is a reason, though, beyond text and structure,
for the distinction  between  national  and state  powers  over issues
implicating race.  As Justice Scalia pointed out in J.A.  Croson, the
Madisonian theory of the national  government holds that it is less
likely to be dominated by self-serving factions and is more likely to
take  a  wider  view  of  the  public  interest  than  state  and  local
governments are.16
Taking this  functional  view of the distinction,  we can  see how
Metro Broadcasting  is a decision involving majoritarian egalitarianism.
According  to Justice  Brennan's  opinion for  the  Court, because  a
majority of the people  of the United  States,  acting  through their
representatives, have determined that minority preference programs
serve egalitarian goals,  their decision should be upheld. 17
Majoritarian  egalitarianism  helps  make sense  of an  otherwise
puzzling  passage  in  Frontiero v.  Richardson,18  in  which  Justice
Brennan tried to persuade the Court to declare that gender was a
"suspect classification. "19  The  case involved  the  constitutionality
of a federal statute that awarded  spousal  benefits to male service-
men but required female members of the armed forces to demon-
strate that their spouses were dependent on them before they could
receive  spousal benefits.20  Although Justice Brennan was inclined
to find sex a suspect  classification and told his colleagues  that he
would like to do  so, he first circulated  an opinion saying that the
distinction  embodied  in  the  statute  was  simply  arbitrary. 2 1  Yet,
analysis inJ.A. Croson, it drops out entirely of the reconstruction.  Second, Boling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), at least in the context of school segregation, held
that  it  would  be  "unthinkable"  to  subject  the  national  government  to  lesser
restrictions than state  governments.
16 488 U.S.  at 522-23  (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
17 The statement in the text short-circuits the rest of the Court's opinion, which
applied a "standard of  review" to decide that the minority preference programs were
permissible.  See 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.  For the purposes of this essay, the "standard
of review" and its application are unimportant.  For a discussion of the degree of
deference Justice  Brennan's  opinion  paid  to  the  majority's  conclusion  that  the
minority preference  programs  did  indeed  serve  egalitarian  goals,  see  infra text
accompanying notes 31-34.
18  411  U.S.  677 (1973).
19  Id. at 682-88.
20 Id. at 678-79.
21 The  facts recounted here  are drawn from  B. SCHWARTZ,  THE  UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS  OF  THE  BURGER  COURT  65-82  (1988),  although my interpretation  of theBRENNAN,  EQUALITY, AND  MAJORITY RULE
because the statute was founded on the undoubted  fact that more
wives of servicemen were dependent on them than were husbands
of servicewomen  on their spouses, the use of that standard would
substantially alter existing understandings of  what "arbitrary" meant.
Prodded by Justice  White, and consistent with his  initial  desires,
Brennan  recirculated  a  draft  saying  that  gender  was  a  suspect
classification.
22
The  redraft  failed  to  gain  a  majority,  but  it  appeared  in
substantially  unaltered  form  as  the  opinion  of a plurality  of the
Court.23  After discussions of the history of discrimination against
women  and  of  the  immutability  of  gender,  the  opinion  found
support for its conclusion in congressional action. Justice Brennan
mentioned the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, more controversially,  the submission
of the  Equal  Rights Amendment  to the  states.24  On  the surface,
this is surprising.  Declaring sex a suspect classification would have
accomplished  almost everything  that  adopting  the  Equal  Rights
Amendment would.  Yet, because  the amendment had only been
submitted to the states but not ratified, Justice Brennan's position
seems to be that Congress  effectively can amend  the Constitution
itself. Congress merely needs to submit an amendment to the states
and then ask the Court to take the submission of the amendment as
an  indication  of a  majority's  views  on  a matter  of constitutional
dimension.  As Justice Powell put it in an opinion concurring in the
result:  "[T]he  Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the
very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional
democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment."25
Justice  Brennan's position in Frontiero, however, is less strange
than it initially  appears.  In a number  of contexts,  the Court has
relied  on  majoritarian  disapproval  of  a practice  to  establish  its
unconstitutionality.  For example,  in finding unconstitutional  the
imposition  of the  death  penalty  on  an  offender  who  was  under
fifteen years old at the time he committed murder, the Court relied
in part on the widespread but not universal judgment that capital
punishment was inappropriate in such cases.26
state of the law differs from Schwartz's.
22 See id. at 78-79.
23  See id. at 81.
24 411 U.S.  at 687.
25 Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in  the judgment).
26 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.  815, 821-33  (1988).
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By  making  such  decisions,  the  Court  does  two  things  that
deserve note.  First, it pushes the society further in the direction it
was already moving.  One might think of the Court as cleaning up
some matters that had fallen by the wayside  as the majority of the
society moved on. Second, it transforms an existing majority's views
about sound policy into a constitutional mandate.  One might worry
that the Court could get things wrong.  Conceivably, it might detect
a  movement in  a  "progressive"  direction  (however  defined)  and
constitutionalize  it, thereby making it impossible for the society to
change course.  That fear, though, is overstated.  If the Court "got
it wrong" and the society came to want to change course, at some
point the composition  of the  Court would  change too, and a new
majority on the Court would unfreeze  the situation.
Consider  here  the  aftermath  of Frontiero.  The  Equal  Rights
Amendment  was  not  ratified,  yet Justice  Brennan  correctly  per-
ceived  general  social support  for a principle  of gender  equality.
Suppose the Court had adopted Justice Brennan's position in 1973.
Thereafter the test applied in cases of gender discrimination would
have been strict scrutiny rather than intermediate  scrutiny, as it is
now.  Would the cases since  1973 have come out differently under
strict scrutiny?
Answering  such  a  question  obviously  invites  controversy.
Deciding  whether  some  statute  survives  the  prescribed  level  of
scrutiny is  an exercise in judgment, and judgments will vary.  Most
commentators  believe that the Court did something unusual when
it invalidated  a  zoning  regulation  in  City  of Cleburne v.  Cleburne
Living  Center, 27  using  the  lowest  level  of review  for  a  "rational
basis." 28  At the  other end of the scale, Justice O'Connor suggest-
ed inj.A. Croson that a set aside program could satisfy strict scrutiny
if it was designed to "break down patterns of deliberate exclusion"
of minority  contractors  from  subcontracting.29  This  is  at least a
slight modification of the usual understanding that strict scrutiny is
"'strict'  in  theory  and  fatal  in fact."30  The  point is  that  circum-
stances  affect  what  counts, as  satisfying  any  prescribed  level  of
review.
27  473 U.S. 432 (1985).
28  Id.  at 446-50.
29  488 U.S. at 509.
30 Gunther, The Supreme Court  1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of  Evolving Doctrine
on a  Changing Court: A  Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.  L.  REV.  1,  8
(1972).BRENNAN,  EQUALITY, AND MAJORITY RULE
Had the Court adopted strict scrutiny for gender classifications,
and had the  Equal  Rights  Amendment  failed,  I wonder  whether
strict scrutiny for gender classifications would mean the same thing
that it might have meant to Justice Brennan in 1973.  I suspect that
it  would  not-that,  in  light  of  the  society's  understandings  as
reflected  in  the  failure  of the  Equal  Rights  Amendment,  strict
scrutiny for gender classifications would look a lot like intermediate
scrutiny does today.
The preceding analysis connects the majoritarian egalitarianism
of Frontiero  and Metro Broadcasting. Both cases involve two kinds of
confidence.  First, in bothJustice Brennan expresses confidence in
the judgment  of the  people  of the  United  States:  The  Court
stressed that the  "conclusion of a coequal branch of Government"
that classifications based  on sex were  "inherently invidious  ...  is
not without  significance,"31  and  Congress's  decision  to  mandate
the minority preferences  had "overriding significance."32
Second,  in both cases Justice Brennan expresses,  more  subtly,
confidence  in  the  Court's  ability  to  detect  when  a  majority's
decision is  indeed egalitarian  in a constitutional sense and when it
is either merely a policy preference or actually inegalitarian.  Justice
Kennedy's dissent in Metro Broadcasting  put the question to Justice
Brennan  quite  sharply.  Suppose  we  do  defer  to  majoritarian
judgments  about  what  best  promotes  egalitarian  goals.  Justice
Kennedy pointed  out that,  at least  since  the  rise  of majoritarian
democracy, defenders  of inequality routinely have defended  their
proposals  as  "truly"  promoting  equality  in  the  long  run.33  In
retrospect, of course, we have concluded that segregation did not
promote equality, but in the midst of the battle how are we to know
whether  a racial  classification  is  benign  (egalitarian)  or invidious
(inegalitarian)?  Justice  Brennan  responded  in  a footnote,  saying
that  the  Court  was  "confident"  that  it  could  "separate  benign
measures  from other types of racial classifications." 34  The source
of his confidence, though, was not spelled out, and a skeptic might
point out that anyone adoptingJustice Brennan's view would almost
inevitably  be  confident  in  his  or  her  ability  to  make  the  very
judgments that Justice Kennedy tried to bring into question.
31 411 U.S.  at 687-88.
32  110 S.  Ct. at 3008.
33  110 S. Ct. at 3044-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 3008 n.12.
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A similar confidence ch aracterizes Justice Brennan's opinion for
the  Court in Baker v.  Carr. 35  The  issue was whether voters  could
challenge  legislative  apportionments  on  the  ground  that  vote
dilution violated the equal protection  clause.  Most of the opinion
deals  with the political questions  doctrine.  For my purposes, the
relevant criterion is that cases present political questions if there are
no "judicially  discoverable and manageable standards for resolving"
them.-6  But,  said Justice  Brennan,  there were judicially  manage-
able standards  in apportionment  cases:  "Judicial standards under
the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it
has  been  open  to courts  since  the  enactment  of the  Fourteenth
Amendment  to determine  . . . that a  discrimination  reflects  no
policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious  action."37
As it turned out, the Court moved rapidly from this "no policy"
position to "one person, one vote,"  as was almost certainly inevita-
ble.38  The "one person, one vote" standard has numerous  attrac-
tions.  It captures  the central, though not the only, social meaning
of the vote in our society.  Any other policies that apportionment
might  reflect  could not yield  the judicially  manageable  standards
that Justice Brennan asserted were "well developed and familiar."39
In many ways,  the very flatness of Justice  Brennan's discussion  of
the equal protection clause in Baker is its most striking aspect.  It is
all so obvious, the opinion seems to say.  As indeed it is, to one who
is confident in the ability of the courts to discover what the people
of the country really prefer.
Metro  Broadcasting expresses  Justice  Brennan's  majoritarian
egalitarianism  at  the  end  of  his  time  on  the  Court.  Cooper v.
Aaron,
40  the Little Rock  school case,  exposes  another facet of that
commitment, near the beginning of his service  on the Court.  The
opinion in Cooper  was signed by all the Justices, at the suggestion of
Justice  Harlan,  but Justice  Brennan  was  the  principal  drafter.
41
35 369 U.S.  186  (1962).
36 Id.  at 217.
37 Id. at 226.
8 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.  533 (1964).
39Justice Harlan's dissent in Riynolds listed the following as among the permissible
elements  in  apportionment:  history,  group  interests,  area,  geography,  sparse
settlement, occupation, and balancing urban and rural power.  Id. at 622-23 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).  If they are, Baker v.  Carr  was wrong, for there appears to be no way
to transform them, or any similar list, into ajudicially manageable standard. Harlan,
of course, dissented in Baker. See 369 U.S.  at 330-49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40 358 U.S.  1 (1958).
41  See B.  SCHWARTZ,  SUPER  CHIEF:  EARL  WARREN  AND  HIS  SUPREME  COURT-ABRENNAN,  EQUALITY, AND MAJORITY RULE
The  Court's opinion opened with a vigorous statement,  drafted by
Justice Black,  that the case "raises questions of the highest impor-
tance to  the  maintenance  of our federal  system  of government,"
because  "[i]t  necessarily  involves  a  claim  by  the  Governor  and
Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey
federal  court orders resting on this Court's considered  interpreta-
tion of the United States Constitution."42  The core of the opinion
described what Justice  Brennan  called  "some basic  constitutional
propositions"43 to  refute  the  premise  that  Arkansas's  governor,
Orval  Faubus,  was  not bound by the  Court's  holding in Brown v.
Board of Education."  Because  the  Constitution was  the  "supreme
Law  of the  Land,"45  and  because  the  Supreme  Court  had  the
power  to  "say  what  the  law  is,"46  it  followed  that  "the  federal
judiciary is supreme  in the exposition  of the  law of the  Constitu-
tion."47  As a result, the Court's interpretation  of the Constitution
in  Brown had  "binding  effect"  on  state  officials  like  Governor
Faubus.48  "No state legislator  or executive  or judicial  officer  can
war against  the  Constitution  without violating  his  undertaking  to
support  it."49  The  opinion concluded by stating that "the  obedi-
ence  of the States to  [the principles announced in Brown] ...  are
indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our
fundamental charter for all of us.  Our constitutional ideal of equal
justice under law is thus made a living truth."5"
Unlike  Metro Broadcasting and Frontiero, Cooper does  not deal
directly with the substantive law of equality.  Its commitment to one
version of the rule of law, however, is an important complement to
Justice  Brennan's  vision  of  a  majoritarian  egalitarianism.  By
insisting that the rule of law demands compliance with the Supreme
Court's  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  Cooper ties  together
majoritarianism and the egalitarianism Justice Brennan would have
the Court articulate.  The people of the United States, that is, have
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY  295-301  (1983); Letter from Justice Harlan to justice Brennan
(Sept. 23, 1958) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 584, file:  Cooper v.
Aaron).
42 358 U.S.  at 4.
43 Id. at 17.
44  347 U.S.  483 (1954).
'-  358 U.S.  at 18 (quoting U.S.  CONST. art. VI).




" Id.  at 19-20.
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a  fundamental  commitment  to  the  rule  of law, which,  in Justice
Brennan's view, serves their long-term interest.  Sometimes judicial
review requires  the Court to overturn  decisions made by a tempo-
rary majority  or,  as  in the  segregation  cases,  by  a geographically
concentrated  majority whose views  the Court hoped were rejected
by the people of the country as a whole.  The "rule of law" commit-
ment allows the Court to act on behalf of the permanent or national
majority.  The  vigor of the  Court's assertion  that  the rule of law
required compliance with the necessary implications  of Brown itself
made  the point that Brown was what the nation wanted,  no matter
what  Governor  Faubus  and  other  opponents  of  desegregation
believed.
This vision of the rule of law helps explain a practice by Justice
Brennan that some critics argued was inconsistent with his position
in Cooper. After the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death
penalty  under  properly  defined  statutes,  Justices  Brennan  and
Marshall  adopted  the  policy  of  dissenting  whenever  the  Court
denied  review  in  a death  penalty  case.  In over  1400  cases,  they
entered  a dissent stating:  "Adhering to our views  that the  death
penalty  is  in  all  circumstances  cruel  and  unusual  punishment
prohibited by the Eighth  and Fourteenth Amendments,  we would
grant  certiorari  and  vacate  the  death  sentence  in  this  case."51
Some critics called this practice  "lawless." 5 2
On the surface, the tension between Justice Brennan's position
in the death penalty cases and Cooper is apparent.  A majority of the
Court has decided that, contrary  to Brennan, the death penalty  is
not cruel and unusual punishment.  The  Court in  Cooper asserted
that all officials had a duty to follow the Constitution as interpreted
by  the Court.  Brennan, therefore, should have taken the constitu-
51  See,  e.g.,  Benner  v.  Ohio,  110  S.  Ct.  1834,  1834  (1990)  (citation  omitted)
(Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
52  For a version of the criticism, see L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONsTrr-rrLoN 372-73  (1988):
What makes  this humane opinion  so arrogant is that Brennan knows  that
the Fifth Amendment  three  times assumes  the  legitimacy  of the death
penalty  as  does  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  ....  Moreover,  he  also
understands  that  a majority  of his countrymen  and  his  fellow Justices
disagree with his opinion ....  No one has a right to veto the Constitution
because his moral reasoning leads him to disagree with it in so clear a case.
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall corrupt the  judicial process and discredit
it.
See also Mendelson,  Brennan's  Revolution, COMMENTARY,  Feb. 1991,  at 36.BRENNAN, EQUALITY, AND MAJORITY RULE
tionality of the death penalty as a given and attempted faithfully to
apply the eighth amendment doctrine the Court had developed.
Further,  the  Brennan  position  seems  to  be  related  to  the
position  taken  by  then  Attorney  General  Edwin  Meese  that  the
Constitution, rather than its interpretation  by the Supreme Court,
is  the law of the  land to which officials  must adhere.53  Brennan
appears, like Meese, to have been asserting that he was permitted to
act  on  his  own  views  of  the  Constitution  notwithstanding  the
Court's interpretation of the document.  Yet, many liberal support-
ers  of Justice  Brennan  severely  criticized  Meese's  position  as  a
license for anarchy.
54
When Meese's position is properly understood, it is less radical
in its implications than his critics contended, and the position taken
by Justice Brennan is consistent with a proper understanding of the
relationship  between  the  Constitution  as  supreme  law  and  the
Court's interpretations  as supreme law.  There are many situations
in  which  officials  can  act  on  their  own  interpretations  of  the
Constitution even  if those interpretations  differ from the  Court's.
For example, a legislator can refuse to vote for a statute that, as he
or she sees it, would violate the Constitution, even if it is clear that
the Court would uphold the statute.
Cooper is different, though, in one crucial respect:  It is difficult
to  conceive  of a lawsuit  in which  the  legality  of the  legislator's
actions  could be  tested.  In contrast,  in Cooper Governor  Faubus
could  have  been  enjoined  from  interfering  with  the  process  of
desegregation in Little Rock.  In such a lawsuit, Faubus would have
asserted that the Constitution allowed him to do so because, in his
judgment, the Constitution permitted segregation  despite what the
Supreme  Court had  said in Brown.  Faubus's  defense would have
been rejected,  of course, but does his willingness  to submit to an
order against him, at the conclusion of extended litigation, justify
his resistance to Brown until then?  Probably not.  Faubus, knowing
how the  litigation  would  certainly  turn out, acted  improperly  in
refusing  to  adhere  to  the  Constitution  as  interpreted  by  the
Supreme  Court.55  Faubus's  actions were  improper,  though,  not
53 See Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61  TUL. L. REv. 979,  983 (1987).
'  For  a sampling of reactions  to  Meese,  see Tushnet,  The Supreme Court, the
Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney  General Meese:  A  Comment, 61  TUL.  L. REv.
1017, 1017 n.1 (1987).
" That the  end  result  was  certain  is important  to  the  analysis.  If  Faubus
reasonably could have claimed  that, because of changes in the composition  of the
Supreme  Court, Brown might be reversed, he would not have acted improperly in
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because of some fundamental principle that officials must adhere to
the  Constitution  as  interpreted by  the  Court, but because  in the
circumstances  his actions were unlikely to yield any social good and
were highly likely to produce substantial social turmoil, as  indeed
they  did.  In  short,  officials  are  obliged  by  law  to  follow  the
Constitution,  not  the  Supreme  Court,  but  quite  often  they  are
obliged by prudence to follow the Supreme  Court.
Justices  of the Supreme  Court are in a different position from
other  officials.  They,  too,  are  limited  by  prudence,  but  the
consequences of their actions are different from those of governors
or legislators.  For ajustice to take a principled stand in dissenting
from a denial of review in a death penalty case is, from thatJustice's
point of view,  to adhere to  the Constitution as supreme law, with
essentially none of the consequences about which a prudent official
ought to worry.
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For Justice  Brennan,  then,  the  prudent  exercise  of  power
undergirded the rule of law and made a stable social order possible.
By  making  prudence  and  stability  central  to  his  vision  of  the
Constitution,Justice Brennan avoided anxiety about the purportedly
countermajoritarian  character of  judicial review.57 Justice Brennan
attempting  to get that question  before the  Court.  The  likelihood of overruling
similarly  played  a  part in  Abraham  Lincoln's  position  on  slavery,  developed  in
connection with his opposition to the Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19  How.) 393  (1857).  See  First Inaugural Address  of Abraham Lincoln,  in 6
MESSAGES  AND  PAPERS  OF THE PRESIDENTS  5 (J. Richardson  ed. 1898).
MJustice Brennan's practice when rehearings in capital cases were sought showed
that his position rested on ajudgment about what is prudent.  Although he routinely
dissented  from  denials  of review,  he  almost  never  dissented  from  denials  of
rehearings sought by capital defendants.  My research assistants Nicole Tapay and
Katya Lezin and I located approximately 100 cases in which rehearings were sought
and denied. justice Brennan dissented from the denial of rehearing in only two of
them, and in one he was joined byjustices Stevens and Stewart, at least one of whom
must have voted to deny review initially.  See Morgan v. Georgia, 444 U.S. 976 (1979)
(denying rehearing).  (Morgan's  death  sentence  later  was  vacated  by a  federal
appellate court on habeas corpus.  See Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984).
The most recent report of the case that I have been able to locate is a 1987 decision
by the Georgia Supreme Court affirming a decision below to allow certain evidence
to be introduced at Morgan's resentencing.)  I do not warrant the completeness  of
our search, which proved to be quite difficult even using computer search techniques.
When a rehearing is  sought, the relevant law is  not the Constitution but the
internal operating procedures of th e Supreme Court, which state that rehearings can
be granted only if a member of the prior majority votes for a rehearing. For Brennan
to dissent from a denial of rehearing ordinarily would amount to a repudiation of  that
rule, which is less important than the Constitution.  As a matter of prudence, then,
the particular rule of law involved being less important, it is less important to stand
against its ordinary operation.
7 The same concerns are expressed injustice Brennan's opinion for the CourtBRENNAN, EQUALITY, AND MAJORITY RULE
was  untroubled by the fact, if it is one,  that judicial review  means
that the  courts  will overturn  decisions  made by a majority  of the
people.  The absence  of countermajoritarian  anxiety is  built into
majoritarian egalitarianism.  When Justice Brennan expressed  this
theme  in  his jurisprudence,  he  claimed  that  it is  superficial  to
contend that the  courts are acting against the views of a majority.
When they invalidate legislation, the courts are acting on behalf of
a majority that has been unable to overcome some obstacles to the
enactment of its views.
Putting the point this way may understate its scope as reflected
injustice Brennan's opinions.  John Hart Ely's book Democracy and
Distrust58  elaborated a theory of  judicial  review that makes judicial
review a majoritarian  enterprise.  But, Ely's  "distrust" is  a far cry
from the robust confidence thatJustice Brennan expresses.  For Ely,
distrust has two faces.  Sometimes we cannot trust majorities to act
fairly; sometimes we cannot trustjudges to discern what ought to be
done.59  The first kind of distrust makes it essential to develop and
justify judicial review;  the second kind makes it essential to define
the limits of  judicial power.
Justice Brennan's  confidence  similarly has  two faces,  but they
are  precisely the  reverse  of Ely's.  His  approach  to  questions  of
equality  has  two  parts.  First,  the  Supreme  Court  will  give  the
people of the United States what they really want (the majoritarian
element).  Second,  the  people  of the  United  States  really  want
equality  (the  egalitarian  element).  Under this  approach, judicial
review  only  superficially  involves  judicial  action  to  overturn
decisions  made by a majority of the people; at a deeper level, for
Justice  Brennan, judicial  review  involves judicial  enforcement  of
what the majority wants.
Justice  Brennan believed  that we  can trust  the people  of the
United  States  to  make  the  right  decision  if  they  are  given  the
chance, and that we can trust the judges to figure out how to give
them that chance. Justice Brennan's majoritarian defense ofjudicial
review echoes but transforms an earlier approach  to the problem.
Responding to the countermajoritarian  difficulty ofjudicial  review,
some  writers  in  the  1960s  argued  that judicial  review  might  be
in Texas  v. Johnson,  109  S. Ct. 2533  (1989),  the flag-burning case, whose  calming
tones are designed to tell readers  that the prudent response to flag-burning  is to
renew their respect for the flag.
5sJ. ELY,  DEMOCRACY AND  DISTRUST:  A THEORY OFJUDICIAL  REVIEW (1980).
59 See id. at 103.
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understood as a technique of remanding a question for reconsidera-
tion by the people:  an appeal from John drunk to John sober.60
In  that  form,  the  defense  of judicial  review  was  incomplete.
Suppose, after the remand, the people decided that they really did
want the statute  that the  Court had  held  unconstitutional.  I  can
imagine  that the  Court would say, "Well, if that's what you really
want, we'll let you do it.  The statute is no longer unconstitutional,
even  though  it was  when we  first considered  the  case." 61  But,  I
suspect that it would respond more often:  "We really meant it the
first time around."62  Sober second-thought  review,  that is,  does
not look like judicial review as we have come to know it.
Justice Brennan's majoritarian  egalitarianism,  in contrast, does
"justify" judicial  review  in its  classic  form.  If  he  wanted, Justice
Brennan  could  call  judicial  review  a  remand  to  the  people  for
reconsideration, but he would be confident that, on reconsideration,
the people would  conclude:  that the statute at issue should not be
reenacted.  This  is,  of  course,  an  extremely  optimistic  view  of
contemporary  society.
As  I  suggested  in  discussing  Frontiero, Justice  Brennan's
approach works  to the degree that the judges are in tune with the
real  desires  of the  people  of the  country.63  At  this  point it  is
worth emphasizing the resonances of some of the words I have used
to characterize Justice  Brennan's majoritarian  egalitarianism.  The
key words are  "anxiety" and "confidence."  Justice Brennan rarely
expressed the countermajoritarian anxiety that afflicted constitution-
al  theory  under the  influence  of Felix Frankfurter.  He  was  not
anxious  about judicial  review  because  he  was  confident  in  the
judges, in the first instance,  and in the people of the United States
ultimately.  These are, in the end, traits of character, and they are
o For an  early presentation  of the  "remand" idea, see  Bickel  & Wellington,
Legislative  Purpose and the  Judicial  Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv.  L. REV.  1,
32-35 (1957) (noting some of the difficulties of this idea).  For a recent presentation
of the idea, see P.  DIMOND,  THE SUPREME  COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE:  THE ROLE
OF PROVISIONAL  REVIEW  IN  A  DEMOCRACY  (1989).
61  Obviously, changes in the composition of the Court affect its ability to give this
response easily.  Yet, such changes do not seem to be what the "remand" theorists
had in mind.
62 See, e.g.,  United States v. Eichman,  110  S.  Ct. 2404 (1990)  (holding the Flag
Burning Act unconstitutional).  I  note, though, that the events associated  with the
flag-burning  episode  probably  can  be  used  to  support  whatever  position  one
maintains about the constitutional order.
63 For a similar analysis, though with a more skeptical edge, see A.  BICKEL, THE
SUPREME  COURT AND  THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).1991]  BRENNAN, EQUALITY, AND  MAJORITY RULE  1371
undeniably attractive.  Justice Brennan became honored, I believe,
not so much because he was  right so often  (though he was),  but
because he showed us that we wanted to be right.